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Abstract 
This article analyses the ongoing transformations occurring in the regime of 
visibility of migration governmentality in the Mediterranean sea, investigating two 
complementary politics of visibility: on the one hand, humanitarian visibility, that 
is the threshold of visibility fixed by humanitarian actors, and in this specific case 
the visibility at stake with the military-humanitarian operation Mare Nostrum, that 
produced a sort of good border spectacle of the rescue; on the other, the (nearly) 
real-time visibility envisaged by monitoring systems like Eurosur, that articulates 
temporality (the real-time one) with a specific look situational awareness. The 
article interrogates how humanitarian visibility and real-time visualization are 
articulated in the current Mediterranean context for producing migratory events, 
tracing maps of future risks and opening new spaces of governmental intervention. 
I conclude by drawing attention to strategies through which both activists and 
migrants have appropriated and utilized visibility in their own ways by demanding 
that people in distress at sea are 1promptly rescued. 
Keywords 
Keywords; separated by semicolons; try to limit to one line; six or fewer words 
1Message received on the Watchthemed mailing list from activists who have been called by 
migrants in distress at sea. 




We received an SOS call from a boat in the Mediterranean with 
about 200 people on board. This is a message for the Coast Guard 
and for the Navy. We have the number of their satellite phones, in 
order to find where they are. The people who called told us that they 
have been travelling for 14 hours and that the boat is starting to have 
technical problems. 
This message, sent via email to the Italian coast guard and to the Navy, 
reports one of the daily SOS message launched in the Mediterranean by migrants at 
sea escaping wars. In such a context, Libya has become a point of multiple 
departures: people escaping Syria, Palestine and Iraq, but also third-country 
nationals working in Libya and now fleeing the country because of the political 
crisis there. The message was sent by a group of activists based between Germany 
and Italy that have put into place an alternative alarm network, monitoring the 
rescue operations of the Italian Navy and facilitating the connections between the 
persons on the sinking boats and the Italian authorities. The group advises the 
Italian Navy that there are vessels in distress and verifies that they effectively 
rescue people. Indeed, since October 2013, the Italian Navy has been in charge of 
coordinating the “military-humanitarian” operation Mare Nostrum for “saving 
migrants’ lives” in the Mediterranean. Their bulletin is updated daily with large 
numbers of people who have either been rescued or those who died before because 
the Italian Navy arrived too late or nobody detected them. Deaths at sea are 
certainly not a new event in the Mediterranean. In the early 2000’s the 
denomination of  the Mediterranean as a “maritime cemetery” was introduced by 
activists  to highlight the incredible number of migrants who have died in the 
attempt to cross the sea: from 1988 to 2013 the estimated number of deaths in the 
Mediterranean is about 23, 0002. Furthermore, this number does not include those 
who are missing, for example, when no shipwreck has been attested nor the bodies 
found. Confronting deaths at sea means dealing with an incalculable margin of 
approximation that ultimately corresponds to the elusiveness of undocumented 
migrants’ visibility, due to their strategies of concealment but also due to state 
authorities that many times do not detect them or let them drown. 
This article focuses on the current politics of visibility in the Mediterranean 
Sea form the point of view of the contested task of controlling and rescuing 
migrants: it investigates the (nearly) real-time mapping performed by monitoring 
tools and systems such as Eurosur, and simultaneously it brings attention to what I 
call humanitarian visibility at sea, interrogating how migrants and activists have 
strategically played with them. By “humanitarian visibility” I mean the regime of 
visibility shaped by humanitarian actors as one of the pillars of their intervention: 
that is, the thresholds and the mechanisms defining what must be seen and what 
                                                
2 http://www.unitedagainstracism.org/pdfs/listofdeaths.pdf  
ACME: An International Journal for Critical Geographies, 2016, 15(3): 561-579  563 
can pass undetected or unnoticed. If visibility is a salient issue in the field of 
humanitarian politics, such a regime and its thresholds of visibility and invisibility 
change over time.  
This paper illustrates that since the start of the military-humanitarian 
operation Mare Nostrum coordinated by the Italian Navy, the Mediterranean has 
appeared as a scene of rescue. The article comes to grips with the transformations 
which have occurred in the politics of visibility in the Mediterranean, highlighting 
how this latter is related to a politics of life, that is to a specific “hold” exercised 
both on singular conducts and on migrant flows, and to a way of selecting between 
subjects of concern and of no concern. The main arguments that sustain the article 
are the following ones. Firstly, monitoring systems for controlling migration in the 
Mediterranean do not provide an overwhelming and continuous visibility but, 
rather, they act selectively and in a desultory way. In this regard, the Eurosur 
system will be taken here as an example of a mapping rationale that does not aim to 
detect migrant vessels in real-time but to collect data about migrant border crossing 
for producing maps of future migration risk scenarios. Secondly, the politics of 
visibility should be seen as a contested field that is strategically appropriated by 
migrants themselves: the struggles over visibility carried on by migrants constantly 
reconfigure not only the thresholds of the visible but also the politics of life that is 
related to it – defining which subjects are the object of governmental concern. In 
order to understand the effective functioning and the implications of (nearly) real-
time mapping, this article starts by taking into account the European External 
Border Surveillance System (Eurosur) launched in December 2013. The start of 
Eurosur has represented an important step in the growing obsession for a real-time 
situational picture of the external border of Europe. Indeed, conceived as “the 
system of the systems”3, Eurosur accesses many European monitoring systems, and 
at the same time generates a real-time map of the illegal crossings and border 
crimes happening at the external borders of Europe (Borderline, 2012; Jandesbodz, 
2011); according to the European Union, this should lead “to strengthen the 
information exchange and operational cooperation between national authorities of 
Member States as well as with the European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States.”4 
Through a close analysis of the functioning of Eurosur the article shows 
that, far from being a system conceived for a real-time intervention, it works as a 
data-storage for producing particular forms of risk analyses and as a constantly 
                                                
3 “The European Defence Agency describes a ‘system of systems’ as a set or arrangement of 
systems that, for reasons of physical distance or of different primary responsibilities, do not lend 
themselves to fusion into a single system. […]This pooling of resources can be made in a centrally 
organised way, or by an association of peers.” (Borderline, 2012, p.18). 
4  Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing the European Border 
Surveillance System (EUROSUR), COM/2013/0197 final.	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updated map that locates migratory events. Then, the article interrogates how 
humanitarian visibility and real-time monitoring are articulated in the current 
Mediterranean context. I conclude by drawing attention to strategies through which 
both activists and migrants have appropriated and utilized visibility in their own 
ways by demanding that people in distress at sea are promptly rescued. In the paper 
I use the term “visualisation” to indicate the visual tools (such as maps) used for 
reporting the detected migratory events. Instead, “visibility” refers here to the 
regime of the seen and the unseen, conceiving it as a contested field that is 
strategically played out by migrants as well as by governmental actors.  
Humanitarian and real-time migration mapping 
It cannot pass overlooked that the ‘ordinary scene of rescue’ performed by 
Mare Nostrum military forces reveals, I suggest, a salient slippage in the 
governmental rationale and, consequently, also in the subjects that are shaped and 
targeted, that is in the ways in which migrants’ lives are captured, managed and 
contained. In order to claim asylum and become subject of the humanitarian 
government, migrants at sea have to expose themselves to the condition of being 
lives to rescue –  like shipwrecked lives. The massive deployment of military 
navies and other technologies is ultimately presented as the countermeasure of 
what appears as the unavoidable condition of those who do not have a Visa for 
entering Europe: that is, it seems that the fact of putting ones’ own life in danger by 
risking death at sea cannot be prevented other than by not migrating; otherwise, 
deaths can be eschewed only as far as a military equipped system intervene.   
Conceiving humanitarianism in terms of politics as a political technology 
for governing singular conducts and migration flows (Fassin, 2007; Walters, 2011), 
and at the same time as a strategy of border enforcement (Williams, 2014) I 
analyze it by looking at the subjects that it shapes and targets as objects of concern. 
In this regard, Foucault’s approach to power relations that focuses on the subject 
that is shaped by them, represents an important analytical tool for tackling borders, 
monitoring mechanisms and bordering processes by looking at the subjectivities 
that are produced, targeted and posited by them (Foucault, 1982). To what extent 
and in which terms are subjects monitored and seen by governmental technologies 
and monitoring systems, and what do these systems aim to record? These questions 
are here raised together with a further interrogation about what can be called ‘the 
production of the event’ that characterizes the (nearly) real time mapping gazes that 
target undocumented migration and border crossing crime. What is put on the map 
by monitoring devices as a migration event? What are the thresholds of visibility 
that define the passage of migrants in a certain place as an “event of concern”? 
In this regard, it is worth observing that a specific regime of visibility is at 
stake in every political technology, since visibility – conceived as the articulation 
of the seen and the unseen, of what can be seen and of what is left or produced as 
invisible – is one of the tools through which the field of power relations is 
structured. Therefore, government is always also a government through visibility, 
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and this paper deals with the government of migration at sea from such a specific 
point of view, exploring the specificity of the politics of visibility that is currently 
at stake in the Mediterranean. Moreover, since visibility is essentially a contested 
field and is not played in a unidirectional way – e.g. by actors that govern 
migrations – the point is to grasp how the thresholds of visibility are constantly 
strategically altered and challenged by subjects. Gregoire Chamayou’s reflection 
on the political implications of the increasingly extensive use of drones provides 
important analytical tools for interrogating the kind of critical perspective through 
which addressing the mapping and monitoring systems envisaged from detecting 
migrants. From a methodological point of view, a critical analysis of technological 
and monitoring devices should be made not for asking whether or not the goal 
justifies those mapping technologies but rather to assess the political stakes that the 
proliferation of visual monitoring systems for governing migration entails 
(Chamayou, 2013, p.16). To put it differently, the growing centrality gained by 
mapping devices for controlling, containing and monitoring mobility, should lead 
us to interrogate the governmental gaze that sustains the current struggle over a 
real-time visibility. From a methodological point of view this point can be framed 
also according the Foucaultian notion of problematization (Foucault, 1998): as 
William Walters stresses, any emergent political or technical object must be treated 
“not as something self-evident, but as a space of problematization whose unfolding 
needs to be situated amid technologies of investigation, representation and truth-
telling” (Walters, 2014, p. 7). Unpacking the governmental gaze means inquiring 
into the specific ontology of the visible that qualifies the real-time “cartographic 
anxiety” (Gregory, 1994): what are the thresholds of political visibility that are 
traced by these mapping tools, and what is actually searched? My hypothesis is that 
the regime of visibility at play in the government of migration at sea has not as its 
primary goal to see – namely to identify people; rather, it aims to detect a presence 
or a trace in order to determine that there is a migratory event to tackle or that 
possible future migration risks could occur. In this regard, the image of a “scopic 
regime” of visibility (Jay, 1999; Gregory, 2011; Somaini, 2005) captures quite 
nicely the selective and targeted functioning of migration monitoring tools. 
Nevertheless, I contend, in the context of migration those mechanisms respond 
more to an even patchy visibility and to a “desultory” rhythm (Tazzioli, 2014) than 
to a constant and pervasive mode of visual apprehension. 
To start, it is important to take into account two kinds of images and forms 
of capture that are simultaneously at play in the (nearly) real-time migration 
cartography: the trace and the event. The trace – the production of the trace of 
migrants’ passage – has important implications for the reconstruction of migrants’ 
shipwrecks. The event consists in the designation of ‘migratory events’, namely 
migrants’ crossings or presences that are detected and then translated on the map as 
‘migratory events’ of concern. Both of these two visualizing mechanisms of 
capture contribute to a regime of visibility that is not primarily grounded on an 
identification strategy. 
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Eurosur and the production of migratory events 
By combining different real-time mapping systems, Eurosur’s task is to 
check when an illegal immigration event or a border crime event takes place at the 
European borders. Then, after the event is detected and the system has collected 
enough data to determine its consistency and the possibility of managing and 
tackling it, “the following step consists in establishing its level of impact and the 
risk factor associated with it”. But what does “level of impact” stand for? It 
designates the level of intervention, technical tools, people and money that are 
estimated to be necessary for managing a certain migration phenomenon. 
Moreover, the “level of impact” of a migration phenomenon happening in a 
specific border region is the yardstick for determining the financial assistance that 
member states could ask from the Commission. However, the definition of the 
level of impact case by case is not an undisputed affair5; in principle, it should be 
the outcome of the negotiation between Eurosur and the member state in question. 
When no agreement is reached between the two, Eurosur has the right to determine 
the “impact” of the migration phenomenon. The “border impact” basically depends 
on the mobilization of costs and resources as well as on the technical difficulties in 
managing a certain migration phenomenon: 30 Egyptians who arrive irregularly in 
Italy are not estimated to have a real border impact, due to the repatriation 
agreement granting fast deportations that Italy has with Egypt –, but the same 
number of Eritreans could have much relevance in terms of border impact, since 
their management requires a longer procedure. For determining the border impact, 
both qualitative and quantitative aspects about “illegal” border crossing and events 
of concern are taken into consideration. Thus, in principle Eurosur is conceived for 
registering and putting on the map any illegal migration event or cross-border 
crime; but, actually, the entity of the dots marked on the map depends on the risk 
factor associated with that migration phenomenon and its manageability – namely, 
the estimated costs and the feasibility of tackling it. Therefore, the widespread 
discourse on the real-time situational awareness6 that underpins the promotion of 
Eurosur in many EU documents should not be overstated in its effective 
functioning. In fact, it is certainly important to investigate the meaning and the 
political use of the ‘situational awareness’ rhetoric, as Joseph Pugliese has showed 
(Pugliese, 2013), but this should not lead us to imagine a sort of digital panopticon. 
Far from envisaging a constant overall gaze on the Mediterranean, Eurosur 
consists in producing events starting from the multifarious partial digital mapping 
                                                
5 Interview with Eurosur’s officer at the Home Office in Rome, August 2014. 
6 This term or military origins is defined by the European Commission as what “measures the 
capability of the authorities to detect cross-border movements and find reasoned grounds for control 
measures.” The concept is strictly related to the notion of "reaction capability” that “measures the 
lapse of time required to control any cross-border movement and the time and means necessary to 
react adequately to unusual circumstances.” 
http://eapmigrationpanel.org/page18261.html?template=print  
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gathered by the different monitoring systems to which Eurosur has access7. The 
geopolitical landscape of Europe is redrawn by Eurosur’s mapping strategy through 
a cartography of dots-events: the size of a dot on the map is not given by the 
number of migrants but, as I said above, by their potential impact and the greater or 
lesser feasibility of their management. Moreover, Eurosur does not record any 
movement or presence detected at the external borders of Europe: only those 
border crossing practices that are labeled as “illegal” are translated into events of 
concern on the map. Nevertheless, it is not a monitoring gaze that takes snapshots 
of a space and produces a fixed map of that space-time unit: on the contrary, as 
Eurosur’s officers explain8, the main goal is not to ‘freeze’ the event once it is put 
on the map but, rather, having the possibility to rework it over time. For instance, a 
few hours after an illegal border crossing is detected and a migrant vessel is 
intercepted by national authorities or by Frontex, the (nearly) real-time Eurosur’s 
map is updated with this event of concern. However, after this first data input of a 
new migration event on the map, this can be further updated with additional 
elements and information about that illegal border crossing. It is important that the 
mapping system is able to account for a temporal continuity that corresponds to the 
development of the event itself. Therefore, beyond the object-event in itself, the 
most salient issue for this real-time mapping rationale consists in the 
transformability of the description and the narrative of the event, according to new 
information and data gathered on it. This temporal deployment of the migratory 
event and its breakdown in different aspects ultimately allow it to be framed in 
terms of its governability, assessing the risk factors associated with it. 
But is it effectively a question of a real-time event that is put on the map? 
Actually the delay that always occurs between the moment of data capture and the 
update of the map is not an exception: on the contrary, the lag in putting data on the 
map is somehow constitutive of Eurosur’s mechanisms for producing the event, 
since it could also take more than 24 hours for the “border crime” to be “translated” 
on the Eurosur’s map. “The qualifier ‘near’ succinctly names the latency effect that 
haunts the micro-rift between ‘live’ and ‘real time’ because of the ineluctable 
logics of tele-techno mediation that effectively transmute ‘live’ images into 
retrospectively constructed spatiotemporal visual artefacts” (Pugliese, 2013). In 
fact, more than taking this mapping-lag, that is the latency that occurs between the 
detection of movements and their translation on the map, as the sign of a failure of 
the system, it is worth interrogating what such a lag reveals in terms of 
governmental approach and politics over life (Kurgan, 2013). Actually, this 
unavoidable lag helps to disentangle Eurosur’s ambiguous formulation about the 
twofold task of securing borders and saving people’s lives: “the aim of saving of 
life has nothing to do with an on-time rescue strategy and prompt interventions. 
Rather, we save lives as far as we hamper would-be migrants from leaving by 
                                                
7 Jora, AIS, European satellite system, national coordination centres and Marsur 
 8 Interview with Eurosur’s officers in Rome, at the Italian Home Office (July, 2014). 
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boats, undertaking risky journeys, and in this sense we contribute to prevent 
migrants’ deaths”9. At the same time, this structural mapping-delay gives us a clue 
about the temporality of the governmental hold, suggesting repositioning and 
downplaying the effectiveness of a real-time map. This does not mean disregarding 
that the (unachieved) goal of a real-time situational awareness represents an 
important turning point in the discursive regime and in the technological 
developments of the migration regime: as William Walters argues, “situational 
awareness is a particular form of temporal engineering. It privileges the acquisition 
and communication of ‘near real time’ information about events and processes as 
they unfold” (Walters, 2014, p.2). However, we need to bring attention to the 
effective temporal acting of bordering mechanisms that stretch beyond (nearly) 
real-time snapshots and project them into possible future scenarios starting from a 
present migratory event – namely, the future risks that a certain migratory pressure 
could engender. Grounding on a series of data gathered over time, this virtual 
future temporality establishes the possible risky outcomes of the event to manage. 
Indeed, it involves a sort of archiving gesture: more than for a prompt use, 
migrants’ movements and the position of their vessels captured through images are 
stored, disassembled into multiple data and added to the national databases and 
then transferred into Eurosur’s data-platform. Hence, by exceeding the single event 
that is detected and put on the map, the different elements that form it (number and 
nationality of people on the boat, vessel’s location, time for finding it etc.) are the 
basis for tracing future cartographies of governmentality10. 
After this excursus on the temporal stretch of nearly-real time monitoring 
systems we should scrutinize what is seen and what is searched for by this 
migration mapping gaze, in order to understand the objects of this regime of 
visibility. As explained above, the visibility that emerges from these combined 
multiple monitoring mechanisms does not focus primarily on singularities: despite 
the potentiality of some advanced dispositives of surveillance to discern even 
individual bodies, the politics of visibility at the external borders of Europe aims 
rather to detect unauthorized practices of movements for recording and translating 
them on a map as events of concern. Track and record – more than monitoring and 
control – could be the formula for describing the reactive cartography11 traced by 
these technologies for mapping migration and that gestures towards an anticipatory 
space of governmentality (Tazzioli, 2014). Indeed, the real-time mapping-anxiety, 
                                                
9 Interview with the head officer of the Italian national coordination center, based at the department 
of Public Security of the Home Office (Rome, 12 august, 2014). 
10 William Walters observes that in the context of European border management “situational 
awareness is both a matter of combating adversaries –who now become the smugglers, traffickers 
and perhaps terrorists. But it is simultaneously a struggle with an information system and its 
imperfections” (Walters, 2014, p6). 
11 This expression refers to the fact that migration governmental maps “are actually the result of 
frantic practices that pursue migrants, trying to hijack, deviate and when possible anticipate their 
moves” (Tazzioli, 2014, p.144). 
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that characterizes the current politics of migration control at a distance is eminently 
grounded on a strategy of what Andrew Herscher calls “surveillant witnessing” 
(Herscher, 2014, p. 473), aimed at tracking migrants’ movements. It is in fact on 
the basis of an undercovering monitoring strategy12 that mapping systems try to 
trace a real-time situational awareness picture of unauthorized movements in the 
Mediterranean: by detecting and archiving migrant crossing , an anticipatory map 
of possible future risks then is produced. For instance, Frontex risk-analysis13 is 
definitively one of the most well-known anticipatory maps, which are actually one 
of the primary sources for Eurosur’s analyses. 
The identification, mapping and archiving of migratory events does not 
work through individualization, as other categorization practices do. On the 
contrary, especially in the context of migration governmentality at sea, what is 
searched for and seen by the technological devices that send the information to 
Eurosur is the presence or the trace of a migrant group – namely, a more or less 
indistinct number of people whose practice of movement constitutes an “illegal 
crossing”. Indeed, it is not at the level of mapping but through the encounter 
between the migrant and the (digital or physical) border-line that the border 
working operates through the production and the banning of migration profiles via 
the generation of data double (Amoore, 2013; Bigo, 2011, 2014; Scheel, 2013). 
However, these two quite different mechanisms of crafting borders detach spatially 
and temporally from the bodily presence are both characterized by a fundamental 
disregard for individual identity (Bigo, 2014). 
At the same time, digital mapping practices displace and unsettle also the 
very notion of borders and force us to move beyond a linear image of them. Indeed, 
the border coincide with what is looked at by the monitoring eyes:  on the one hand 
the borders of Europe mapped by Eurosur – are detached from the EU territory and 
start before – since for instance the Mediterranean itself is considered an external 
frontier of Europe, becoming a sea border zone. On the other hand, the border that 
must be monitored and controlled as such is, at least in part, the result of the 
migratory events that are detected signaling a new risk in a certain area. Indeed, 
once a suspect object is detected, “a rectangle area can be drawn which marks an 
area that the decision maker wants to have surveyed completely” (Bauer, Fischer, 
2010). 
Mapping beyond representation? 
In order to better understand the current struggles over visibility at stake in 
the current politics of rescue in the Mediterranean I introduce a point on the 
                                                
12 This is the expression used by Italian authorities in charge of patrolling the sea, for designating 
the ordinary procedure through which they follow “suspect” vessels. 
13 Frontex Situation Centre was established in 2008, with the aim or producing a multi-layered 
European situational picture and responsible for maintaining the Common Frontier Intelligence 
Picture. 
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relationship between mapping and representation in this real-time mapping gaze. 
Indeed, monitoring mechanisms based on a real-time logic aim less to represent 
migration movements on the map than to craft and locate migratory events of 
concern, tracking migrant vessels and grounding on the (human and digital) traces 
gathered by different systems. On this point, it is worth recalling that what is at 
stake in migration monitoring systems is the fact that starting from detected 
presence of migrants at sea an evaluation can be done about whether or not they 
form a migratory event of concern. Beyond this point, it could be argued that the 
visualizing effect–  what is put on the map as a result of a monitoring action – 
actually is not a mere translation of what has been detected/seen – representing the 
phenomenon in cartographic and visual terms. Rather, it is in itself an event 
producer – crafting migratory events of concerns. Indeed, Eurosur’s system traces 
zones of interventions and select movements of concern, producing a map by 
starting from practice of mobility that must be governed. In a nutshell, what matters 
is the governability of the migratory event (Tazzioli, Walters, 2016). In other 
words, these maps, insofar as they visualize an object of concern, open or change a 
space of governmentality, that is a space defined and bordered by the very 
techniques deployed for governing and containing a migratory event. Thus, this 
reveals that through the gesture of map updating, a certain space of intervention is 
opened on the basis of the ‘impact’ of the mapped events and on the measures 
necessary for tackling it. More than in terms of tracing and mapping, it would be 
perhaps more appropriate to talk about a spatial crafting, meaning by that the 
transformations that real-time monitoring systems produce in the way in which a 
specific area becomes a border-zone of intervention. 
Nevertheless, it is important to stress again that it is not necessarily the 
immediateness of the response that qualifies the functioning of Eurosur; rather, the 
data gathered are most of the time used for producing risk-analysis maps for future 
interventions. Accordingly, the transformative action staged by the visualizing 
mechanism itself, concerns less a temporal dimension – namely, a prompt reaction 
– than a spatial one – how a given space is reshaped as an area of intervention. That 
said, the production of spaces of governmentality through mapping techniques 
highlights the partial discrepancy between mapping and representation (Daston, 
Galison, 2010, pp. 382-385)14. 
                                                
14 It is important to stress that this is far from being an exclusive characteristic of migration 
monitoring systems. In fact, As Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison explain, “towards the end of the 
twentieth century […] the aim was not simply to get the images right but also to manipulate the 
images. The shift from image-as-representation to image-as-process […] images began to function 
at least as much as a tweezer, hammer or anvil of nature: a tool to make and change things”. 
(Daston, Galison, 2010, p. 383). However, in the context of migration, what Daston and Galison call 
the “image as a tool” should be placed within a broader strategy of surveillance, in which the aim is 
at the same time to produce the event and to visualize what happens at sea. Secondly, “image as a 
tool” works in the field of migration monitoring according to a twofold task: on the one hand, it 
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The politics of trace 
Referring to the production of the data double, Didier Bigo suggestively 
points out that “borders are constructed through the traces left along the passages” 
(Bigo, 2014, p.218). And the assemblage of digital traces – like radar or satellite 
images – is in fact one of the main procedures used in national coordination centres 
for locating a migratory event. Indeed, on Eurosur’s interactive map the European 
space is spotted with red dots signifying the size of the event; and clicking on those 
dots the characteristics of any single ‘migratory event’ or border-crime are 
disclosed to all the people allowed to access the map15. The model of the vessel, the 
number of people on board, the eventual smugglers arrested and the kind of illegal 
action in which they were apprehended are the main sets of information reported 
for any illegal border crossing event. The crafting of the migratory event starting 
from the data capture that is then put on the map and subjected to further 
integrations. As Elisabeth Povinelli puts it, “by design, statistics […] transform the 
borders, qualities, scale, and agency of quasi-events into self-evident eventfulness” 
(Povinelli, 2011: 35). In this way, data are selected and put together to designate a 
migratory event that contributes in tracing the map of ‘risk factors’ at the external 
borders of the EU. 
 When the technological eyes ‘fail’16 to detect a migrant vessel in distress at 
sea, the dynamic of the event can be at least in part reconstructed through the 
combination of disparate elements: weather conditions, eventual emergency calls, 
traces in the radar images etc. This mechanism of reconstructing the event after the 
event has recently been used in the context of the many shipwrecks that have 
happened in the central Mediterranean between 2011 and 2014. In those cases, the 
traces’ assemblage has actually been one of the main strategies mobilized by 
humanitarian international organizations for demonstrating states’ responsibility in 
the failure or in the delay in rescuing migrants at sea. “Liquid traces” is the title of 
the video in which Charles Heller and Lorenzo Pezzani illustrate the stages of the 
Left-to-die boat case, one of the most conspicuous examples of activist counter-
mapping practices: using the images and the traces left by those same technical 
tools used for monitoring and intercepting migrants’ movements, they were able to 
reconstruct what happened during the shipwreck of a migrant vessel departed from 
                                                                                                                                  
opens spaces of intervention; on the other the images produced starting from multiple data become 
in turn data themselves, stored for producing future risk analyses. 
 15 National authorities in charge of managing the national coordination centres and Frontex 
personnel.  
16 The failure of monitoring system in detecting people in distress at sea should be object of an 
attentive theoretical reflection that takes together the politics over (migrants) lives that is at stake in 
migration governmentality at sea, and the technical limits of visibility. Indeed, the non-detectability 
of certain vessels in distress on the one hand shows well that the Mediterranean sea is far from 
being a transparent space to the technological eyes; on the other, it is the mark of the politics of 
letting people drown and die that in part characterize the government of mobility at sea. 
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the Libyan coasts, proving the responsibility of states and international actors for 
the failure to rescue people in distress at sea (Heller, Pezzani, 2014). 
The forensic approach (Weizman, 2007, 2014)– in this context a forensic 
oceanography (Pezzani, 2014) – is at the basis of this data hunt (traces hunt). 
Especially as far as deaths or disappearances are concerned, as it is in the case of 
tragedies at sea, the attention is drawn to objects and tools, instead of people’s 
testimonies in order to reconstruct an event that is the object of political claims for 
knowing the truth and for compensation. Since traces are left in water, “by reading 
them carefully the sea itself can be turned into a witness for interrogation”, 
grounding on “the different electromagnetic waves send and received by multiple 
sensing devices that create a new sea altogether” (Heller, Pezzani, 2014, p. 658). 
However, in the case of unauthorized migrations, the elusiveness of traces is 
something that must be taken into account and that defines the specificity and the 
deadlocks of a ‘politics of traces’ in that field. Indeed, far from always leaving a 
trace or a sign, deaths and disappearances at sea are simply undetected by the 
technological eyes; and thus, even counter-mapping practices that try to take and 
elaborate archives of digital images often have no concrete foothold for 
reconstructing the event. Since counter-mapping is a practice that rests on the same 
tools and images managed, crafted and oriented by governmental instances, they 
cannot see anything other than what power sees. In fact, counter-mapping 
techniques could reveal something that is left overshadowed in official maps and 
reports, as well as in the archives of the monitoring devices. But what occurs 
without leaving any trace in the capturing monitoring systems, simply remains 
ungraspable. The claim for checking what happened during the shipwrecks and 
which digital information was taken and stored, finally could not have a response 
also because of the total absence of traces in the digital archives of the 
technological eyes that watch the Mediterranean Therefore, due to the 
unresponsiveness of monitoring systems in tracing an a posteriori cartography of 
the events, the phantom shipwrecks of migrant vessels that happened in 2011 and 
2012  could not have even been known by European authorities if those absences 
had not become a political urgency in the countries of the missing migrants (Sossi, 
2013)17. 
Coming back to the question about the rationale of visibility that is at stake 
a (nearly) real-time situational awareness picture of the Mediterranean, the goal of 
the mapping systems analyzed here is neither to identify the singular people on the 
boat, nor to make visible what tends to remain in the shadows. Rather, what is of 
relevance is that a migratory event can be detected, recorded and managed, opening 
new spaces of intervention. This requires highlighting the nuanced working of the 
visibility regime in the government of migration, shifting the attention from the 
                                                
17 The understanding of those (tragic) events that were actually unascertained on the Northern shore 
of the Mediterranean, became known because of the denunciation and the struggle of the families of 
the Tunisian missing migrants that marked the disappearance of their sons.  
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binary opposition invisible/visible to the thresholds of political detection that are 
constantly rearranged by migration maps.  “The maritime picture is not only a 
visualization of a map and ship detections. The maritime picture can be viewed as a 
means of collecting all information about the current situation at sea, which also 
includes […] the projection of the current situation in the future” (Bauer, Fischer, 
2010). Secondly, more than seeing everything, the mapping eyes act through a sort 
of partitioning gaze that distinguishes between relevant and irrelevant activities: 
“the challenge in supporting maritime situation awareness […] is therefore not only 
to know about every kind of activity that is going on in the whole area, but also to 
differentiate between relevant and irrelevant activities” (Bauer, Fischer, 2010). 
The “humanitarian visibility” at sea after Mare Nostrum 
Accounting for visibility as a contested field and as a regime – constituted 
by mobile and nuanced threshold of visible and invisible – enables to grasp he 
uneven distribution of the seen and the unseen and what in a given context appears 
as an object of concern. As far as migration at sea is concerned, the issue of 
visibility is related on the one hand to the distribution of political vulnerability 
(Butler, 2006; Povinelli, 2011), that is to the power of rescuing or letting people die 
at sea; on the other, it refers to the battlefield of detectability that is strategically 
played both by migrants and by governmental actors. To be detected at sea for 
migrants may mean being intercepted and pushed back, but it may also mean 
rescue and safe travel to Italy in case of a shipwreck. For state and non-state actors 
involved in monitoring the Mediterranean, a migratory event that passes undetected 
simply does not exist: when the mapping devices do not observe any presence, and 
when no trace is left in the mechanisms of control-through-monitoring, migrants’ 
deaths become disappearances that cannot even be known by the mapping actors. 
Thus, for the technological governmental eyes expecting to detect migrants at sea 
and record a migratory event, the fact that a migrant vessel passes undetected 
entails that it remains a non-event that no authority can account for. 
The working of a political technology cannot be done in the void, by simply 
describing its technical operation as if there were a smooth and neutral space in 
which it operates. On the contrary, mechanisms of control and monitoring must be 
situated in the contested field of governmentality in which they function. Eurosur 
started in December 2013, but actually the first regulation for establishing the 
European Border Surveillance System dates back to 200818 and before the official 
launch many other legislative steps had been made19 (Jandesbodz, 2011). More 
broadly, the first EU proposal for “a surveillance system covering the whole 
southern border of the EU and the Mediterranean Sea” was drafted in 200520. 
                                                
18 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/pdf/eurosur_final.pdf  
19See for instance http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-2013-0232+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN 
20 EU Presidency conclusions of 15-16 December 2005. 
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However, precisely because governmental technologies must be analysed in the 
context of the struggle in which they effectively operate, it cannot pass unnoticed 
that in December 2013 Eurosur started to operate after some important changes 
happened. Indeed, on the 3rd and on the 11th of October 2013 two migrant vessels 
drowned near the island of Lampedusa and more than 600 people died at sea. Mare 
Nostrum is the military-humanitarian response, technically put into place in few 
days by Italy: the peculiarity of this rescue mission does not consist only in the 
decision to go and rescue the migrants on the high sea and near Libyan waters but 
also in the humanitarian task that the Navy is charged to perform. In fact, the 
Italian Navy was at the head of the ‘military-humanitarian mission to save 
migrants’ lives at sea’, coordinating the other Italian police authorities (Guardia di 
Finanza and Guardia Costiera). Quite suddenly, the scene of the ‘good border 
spectacle’ of the rescue called the attention of media, researchers and activists; and 
the central Mediterranean became the object of a constant ‘humanitarian visibility’, 
characterized by the daily bulletin of deaths and rescues released by the Italian 
Navy. The rescue politics that gained ground after this military-humanitarian shift 
in the government of migration at sea, paved the way for two border looks based 
on two different exercises of visibility: an aesthetic of the rescue, based on the 
making-visible humanitarian strategy, and a (supposed) real-time monitoring gaze, 
grounded on visualizing the events on the map. 
Indeed, the implementation of a military-humanitarian border-zone in the 
Mediterranean due to the massive migrant departures from Libya generated a 
hyper-visibility of migrants arriving at Italian harbours on the military boats of the 
Navy. Every stage of the military-rescue was put under the spotlight as if the 
reiterated gesture of making the humanitarian-military border visible were 
constitutive of the humanitarian itself, in this case performed by the military. 
Indeed, as Thomas Keenan remarks, “humanitarian action seems not simply to take 
advantage of the media, but indeed to depend on them”, (Keenan, 2011, p.3). 
Everybody started to look at the sea: different eyes, and not only the media, 
mobilized a scopic gaze towards the military-ferries of the Navy, which rescued 
migrants at sea taking them to Italy. Simultaneously, the visualizing capture of the 
events taking place at sea was the other “visual register” (Belcher, 2015, p.2) very 
close to the situational awareness and real-time mapping rationale I talked about 
above. Or to put it better, the already existing mapping and monitoring systems 
appeared as the actual and ideal technological eyes to visualize on time migratory 
events at sea on the map. However, as the militaries of the Navy explain, the rescue 
system is not mostly based on that kind of visualization – the real-time cartography 
– but rather depends on the monitoring radar systems placed on the Navy’s boats 
and on those parts of the coastal radar network21. However, as I will show in the 
next section, we should not overlook the topicality of real-time monitoring 
rationale in human rights discourses and strategies. In the context of migration 
                                                
21 Interview with the Italian Navy, Rome, March 2014.  
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governmentality at sea, the humanitarian visibility that traditionally sustains human 
rights actions (Azoulay, 2008; Weizman, 2014) is now focused on real-time 
mapping, appropriating such a monitoring gaze. 
The twisting of visibility: migrants’ appropriation of humanitarian and real-time 
mapping 
The Safe Alarm Network was launched on the 10th October 2014, by a 
group of German, Italian and Tunisian activists with the aim of supporting the 
migrants who cross the Mediterranean with unsafe vessels. The transnational 
Network aims to provide a 24/7 hotline for people in distress at sea and, when 
migrants call, to immediately phone the Coast Guard and the Navy, monitoring that 
they effectively go and rescue. In fact, they could not actually set up an alternative 
system of rescue, and consequently decided to work to assure and speed the 
connections between migrants and the authorities in charge of rescuing people; at 
the same time, their counter-visibility action was supposed to control that, once the 
alarm call was received, national authorities would immediately intervene. “If coast 
guards do not act promptly, it will be sought, on the one hand, to enforce rescue 
operations through public pressure. On the other hand, attempts will be made to 
alert cargo ships and tankers in vicinity of the vessel in distress”22. In terms of real-
time devices, the possibility of finding and locating in time migrants in distress at 
sea depends first of all on the technical equipment that migrants who leave Libya 
now have on the boats: indeed, Turaya satellite phones enable the person who calls 
to see the exact location of the boat, and this is automatically read also by the 
authorities that receive the SOS call. Then, activists find the correspondent location 
on the map searching for the latitude and longitude received on the interactive 
Watch the Med platform (http://watchthemed.net/). Through this finding method, 
they should be able to verify the Search and Rescue zone (SAR) zone which the 
vessel is in, and consequently the state that has the duty to go and perform the 
rescue. 
However, this possibility to locate migrants in distress at sea without 
drawing upon radar or other monitoring tools managed by states, depends also on 
the strategies of visibility adopted by migrants with the starting of Mare Nostrum’s 
politics of rescue. Indeed, as I explained above, the media attention on the ‘good 
border spectacle’ of rescue on the one hand, and the goal of a real-time situational 
awareness of the Mediterranean, craft the scene of governvisiblity at sea. The 
rescue operations of the Italian Navy should be situated in a broader techno-
political frame of a politics of visibility and visualization (real-time visibility) and, 
at once, within the humanitarian-military EU’s approach to migrants’ deaths at sea 
after the two big shipwrecks in October 2013 (humanitarian visibility). Thus, 
looked for, targeted and tracked down by an assemblage of humanitarian and 
policing technical gazes, migrants tried to appropriate and twist this striving for 
                                                
22 http://www.watchthemed.net/media/uploads/page/12/Alarmphone-FAQ-english.pd  
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visibility. First of all, aware of Mare Nostrum operation, migrants started to equip 
themselves with the Turaya satellite phones (at least one per vessel) making sure in 
this way of being traceable and seen. Secondly, instead of concealing themselves as 
undocumented migrants used to do, the increased number of deaths at sea on the 
one side and the shift in the EU’s approach towards a politics of rescue on the 
other, led migrants to ride on the humanitarian and real-time visibility, as a way to 
reach Europe. In fact, migrants from Libya facilitated their traceability by national 
authorities and monitoring systems, anticipating in space and time border patrols 
by sending an SOS as soon as they entered the international waters. Since for 
people in distress at sea being visualized on the map by real-time monitoring tools 
means opening and highlighting a space of rescue intervention, migrants staged 
their own capture by the mapping gaze and demanded to be rescued. In this way, 
the “humanitarian visibility” has been in part yielded by migrants’ exposure and 
traceability that demanded to be seen and saved. At the same time, riding on the 
humanitarian visibility that governs their movements, and becoming traceable to 
the monitoring eyes, they promptly visibilized themselves as objects of the 
humanitarian and of the ‘good border spectacle’: the capacity to detect was turned 
into an inescapable duty of rescue. 
Conclusions: a protean visibility? 
The politics of visibility at stake in the Mediterranean has been approached 
here by taking into account the Mediterranean Sea as a space of contested mobility, 
analysing monitoring systems and mapping devices by placing them in a struggle 
over visibility. In this way, the ‘mapping anxiety’ that percolates the 
governmentality of migration at sea, appears as an attempt for detecting, containing 
and managing migrants’ movements. “Actually, migration maps are part of a 
reactive and responsive cartography “based on a logic of spying and hijacking 
migrants’ routes” (Tazzioli, 2014, p.144). In this regard, what can be called a 
protean visibility concerns the simultaneously reactive and anticipatory mechanism 
at the core of the (nearly) real-time mapping rationale – reacting to migrants’ 
movements by tracing spaces of governmentality, and anticipating future migratory 
events through risk analyses. Moreover, if on the one hand this article has stressed 
how the supposed two-sided function (control and rescue) of monitoring systems 
like Eurosur is actually a misleading definition, on the other it has shown how 
migrants have tried to twist humanitarian visibility and visualizing tools, 
strategically playing within a versatile battlefield of visibility. Starting from this 
analytical framework, Eurosur has been scrutinized here in its effective 
functioning, from the point of view of the kind of visibility that it enacts and from 
the standpoint of what is visualized on the map – the migratory event. However, 
this inroad in the struggle over migration visibility in the Mediterranean has been 
made by situating the analysis in a time when the government of migration at sea is 
led by a humanitarian-military logic; this has been well actualized in the Italian 
operation Mare Nostrum, in charge of rescuing migrants at sea by entrusting 
military forces to operate as humanitarian actors. What I called ‘humanitarian 
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visibility’ is certainly not specific of the current Mediterranean context, since rather 
it underpins the humanitarian politics as such (McKee, 2007; McLagan, McKee, 
2012). Nevertheless, in this article I have showed how the articulation between the 
frantic attempt to provide real-time situational awareness of the Mediterranean and 
the refreshed military-humanitarian assemblage has been twisted by activists and 
migrants mobilizing strategies of ‘visibility appropriation’. 
References 
Amoore, L. (2013) The Politics of Possibility: Risk and Security beyond 
Probability, Durham: Duke University Press. 
Azoulay, A. (2008) The Civil Contract of Photography, New York: Zone Books. 
Bauer, A. and Y. Fischer (2010) ‘Object-Oriented Sensor Data Fusion for Wide 
Maritime Surveillance’, Proc. of International Waterside Security Conference 
2010. 
Belcher, O. (2015) ‘Data Anxieties: Objectivity and Difference in early Vietnam 
War Computing’, in L. Amoore, Piotukh, Calculative Devices in a Digital Age. 
Bigo, D. (2014) ‘The (in)securitization practices of the three universes of EU 
border control. Military/Navy –border guards/police - database analysts’, 
Security Dialogue (45)3:209-225. 
Bigo, D. (2010) ‘Freedom and Speed in Enlarged Borderzone’s, in V. Squire, ed. 
The Contested Politics of Mobility. Borderzones and Irregularity. Londong; 
Routledge 
Borderline - The EU's New Border Surveillance Initiatives (2012) – report made by 
Henrich Boll Siftung Foundation, http://www.boell.de/en/content/borderline-
eus-new-border-surveillance-initiatives (last access, 4th December 2014) 
Butler, J. (2006) Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence, London: 
Verso. 
Chamayou, G. (2013) Teoria del Drone, Roma: DeriveApprodi. 
Foucault, M. (1998) ‘Polemics, Politics and Problematizations’ In P. Rabinow, ed. 
Essential Works of Foucault, edited by Paul Rabinow. Vol. 1 "Ethics", New 
York: The New Press. 
Daston, L. and P. Galison (2010) Objectivity, New York: Verso Books. 
Fassin, D. (2007) ‘Humanitarianism as a Politics of Life’, Public Culture, 19(3): 
499-520. 
Foucault, M. (1982) ‘The Subject and Power’, Critical Inquiry 8(4): 777–95. 
Gregory, D. (2011) ‘From a View to a Kill. Drones and Late Modern War, Theory, 
Culture and Society, 28(7): 188-215. 
Gregory, D. (1994) Geographical Imaginations. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Eurosur, Humanitarian Visibility and (Nearly) Real-Time Mapping in the Mediterranean 
 
578 
Herscher, A. (2014) ‘Surveillant Witnessing: Satellite Imagery and the Visual 
Politics of Human Rights’, Public Culture (26): 469-500. 
Jandesbodz, J. (2011) ‘Beyond the Tartar steppe: EUROSUR and the ethics of 
European border control practices’, in J. P. Burgess and S. Gutwirth (eds.), 
Europe under threat? Security, migration and integration, Brussels: VUB Press 
Jay, M. (1999) ‘Scopic Regimes of Modernity’, in H. Foster ed. Vision and 
Visuality, London: Routledge: 30–56. 
Heller, C. and L. Pezzani (2014) ‘Liquid Traces. The Left-to-die Boat Case’, in E. 
Weizman, (ed.), Forensis. The Architecture of Public Truth, New York: 
Stenberg Press: 657-683. 
Keenan, T. (2011) ‘Publicity and Indifference: media, surveillance, humanitarian 
intervention’, http://roundtable.kein.org/node/1218  (last access, 12 December 
2014) 
Kurgan, L. (2013) Close Up at a Distance: Mapping, Technology and Politics, 
New York: Zone Books. 
Mezzadra, S. and B. Neilson (2013) Border as Method. Or the Multiplication of 
Labour, Durham: Duke University Press. 
Mc Kee, Y. (2007) ‘Eyes and Ears": Aesthetics, Visual Culture, and the Claims of 
Nongovernmental Politics in M. Feher, (ed.) Nongovernmental Politics. New 
York: Zone Books. 
McLagan, M. and Y. McKee, eds. (2012) Sensible Politics: The Visual Culture of 
Nongovernmental Activism, New York: Zone Books 
Pezzani, L. (2014) ‘The two lives of Cap Anamur’, in E. Weizman, (ed.), Forensis. 
The Architecture of Public Truth, New York: Stenberg Press: 684-692. 
Povinelli, E. (2011) Economies of Abandonment. Social Belonging and Endurance 
in Late Liberalism, Durham: Duke University Press. 
Pugliese, J. (2013) Statist Visuality, Irregular Migrants, Refugees and Technologies 
of Extraterritorialisation’, Griffith Law Review. 
Scheel, S. (2013) ‘Autonomy of Migration Despite Its Securitisation? Facing the 
Terms and Conditions of Biometric Rebordering’, Millennium, 41(3): 775-600. 
Somaini, A. (2005) ‘On the Scopic Regime’, Leitmotif: 38-43. 
Sossi, F. (2013) ‘Struggles in Migration: The Phantoms of Truths’, in G. Garelli, F. 
Sossi, M.Tazzioli, ( eds.), Spaces in Migration: Postcards of a Revolution, 
London: Pavement Books: 98-115. 
Tazzioli, M., and W. Walters (2016) 'The sight of migration', Global Society, 
accepted for publication. 
ACME: An International Journal for Critical Geographies, 2016, 15(3): 561-579  579 
Tazzioli, M. (2014) Spaces of Governmentality. Autonomous Migration and the 
Arab Uprisings, London: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Walters, W. (2014) ‘Temporal Engineering: Live Governance, Friction and the 
Genealogy of Border Surveillance in Europe’, (unpublished manuscript). 
Walters, W. (2011) ‘Foucault and Frontiers: Notes on the Birth of the 
Humanitarian Border’, in U. Brockling, S Krasmann and T. Lemke, (eds.) 
Governmentality: Current Issues and Future Challenges U, New York: 
Routledge: 138–64. 
Weizman, E. ed. (2014), Forensis. The Architecture of Public Truth, New York: 
Stenberg Press. 
Weizman, E. (2007) Hollowland. Israel’s Architecture of Occupation, New York: 
Verso books. 
William, J.M. (2014) ‘The Safety/Security Nexus and the Humanitarianisation of 
Border Enforcement’, The Geographical Journal: 1-11. 
